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Abstract To cope with demographic ageing trends, the Dutch government has imple-
mented a wide range of institutional reforms. With this, the government has targeted public
finances, the risk-taking capacity of the economy and scarce human capital as its main
areas of challenge. This paper details the most prominent reforms, looking particularly at
social insurance, public pensions and health care. As reforms tighten eligibility criteria and
reshape institutions it is to be hoped that the emphasis will shift to capitalise upon indi-
viduals’ capabilities rather than to focus on their handicaps.
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Introduction
The ageing of the population demands major institutional reforms in social insurance, public
pensions and health care. In the Netherlands, the old-age dependency ratio (i.e., the ratio of
people older than 65 to those between the ages of 15 and 65) is projected to double by 2040 to
around 2:5. As a direct consequence, in the absence of reforms, public spending on health,
social insurance and pensions is expected to increase by more than seven percentage points of
GDP [2] until then. Containing these expenditures constitutes a major challenge to the
political system. Indeed, as the electorate ages, older voters may well block the needed
reforms. A conflict then arises between the political power of the older generation, who
depends on public transfers, and the economic power of the younger, working generation.
Accordingly, the reforms should be announced and implemented sooner rather than later [1].
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In the Netherlands, the burden on the public finances of an ageing society was put on the
policy agenda in 2000. In that year, the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Anal-
ysis—the official planning bureau of the Dutch government—calculated the consequences
of ageing for public finances. These calculations found that the government should run a
substantial surplus of about 1.5% of GDP if it wanted to ensure that current institutional
arrangements are sustainable in the future. With this surplus, public debt was expected to
fall to zero by 2025. Even though the Balkenende cabinets I–III (2002–2006) implemented
substantial institutional reforms, updated calculations in 2006 showed that an even larger
government surplus of 3% would be needed to ensure that current public institutional
arrangements are sustainable [2]. This increase of a further 1.5% was due, among other
things, to higher life expectancy and lower interest rates. An alternative policy to ensure
the sustainability of public finances is to promote greater labour force participation.
Although Dutch labour force participation reached a reasonably high level of 74% in 2007,
Scandinavian countries report substantially higher rates. The Balkenende cabinet IV
(2007–2011) therefore aims not only to cut public expenditures but also to raise labour
force participation.
This paper surveys Dutch policies aimed at addressing the challenges posed by an
ageing society. The policy reforms with respect to unemployment insurance are described
in ‘‘the Unemployment and welfare benefits’’ section. Reforms in disability insurance are
discussed in ‘‘the Disability benefits’’ section and health care reforms in ‘‘the Health care’’
section. ‘‘The old-age pensions’’ section explores how the Netherlands has reformed
its pension system. In addition to discussing reforms actually implemented by Dutch
governments during the last decade, this paper also considers some proposals on unem-
ployment and pensions that were put forward in June 2008 by the Bakker Committee,
which was appointed by the government to come up with proposals to raise labour force
participation. Indeed, the consequences of ageing, not only on public finances but also for
the labour market, are more and more at the centre of the policy debate in the Netherlands.
The last section presents our conclusions.
Unemployment and welfare benefits
Between 2000 and 2003, the Dutch government’s general budget balance deteriorated by
almost 5.5 percentage points of GDP as a result of an economic downturn. Although public
spending remained within the spending ceilings through 2002, temporary social expen-
diture windfalls, on account of strong economic activity during the economic boom at the
end of the previous century, were used to finance permanent increases in public spending
on health care and education. Among other things, the economic downturn at the beginning
of the century raised the number of those claiming wage-related unemployment benefits
from 165,000 in 2001 to 320,000 in 2004. In view of both this short-run increase and the
long-run budgetary costs of ageing, the coalition agreement in 2002/2003 implemented
substantial budget cuts—especially with respect to unemployment benefits.
In particular, in 2003 the government decided to abolish the so-called follow-up
unemployment benefits for the long-term unemployed. At that time, the maximum duration
of unemployment insurance benefits (which are not means-tested) was 5 years, but this
period could be extended by another two and a half years for people older than 57. The
abolition of this extension of the maximum duration of unemployment benefits thus served
to eliminate the possibility for employers to effectively retire their employees at 57 years
of age by supplementing their unemployment benefits with relatively small additional
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transfers. The reinstatement of a job search requirement for older unemployed individuals
in 2003 also helped to raise employment of older workers. Furthermore, following a
unanimous recommendation of employers and unions represented in the Social Economic
Council (SER),1 the maximum duration of unemployment benefits was shortened from five
years to three years and two months. In addition, eligibility requirements were tightened. In
view of the impact of ageing on the availability of labour resources, however, several
observers argued for further reforms in unemployment insurance in order to raise the
quality and quantity of labour force participation by improving the employability of the
workforce.
Consistent with these calls for further reforms, the Bakker Committee proposed con-
verting the current unemployment insurance system into a system of work insurance. The
proposed system consists of three phases, which together last a shorter period of time than
current unemployment benefits. First, during a transfer period of a maximum of 6 months,
the employer will be required to continue to pay the employee while helping that employee
to find another job. If the worker has not found a new job during this transfer period,
responsibility for finding work for the unemployed worker is transferred to a ‘‘Site for
Work and Income’’ (LWI),2 while the unemployment benefit is paid by the industry
concerned. A worker who remains unemployed for more than half a year enters a third
phase, during which the municipality participating in the LWI takes over financial
responsibility. The proposals enhance the incentives for job seekers to accept work through
three channels: first, the duration of wage-linked unemployment benefits is cut; second, job
seekers are required to accept a job below their previous income level earlier; and third,
employers and municipalities participating in LWIs bear the risk of paying unemployment
benefits and thus are induced to help and encourage the worker to find another job.
Indeed, important elements in the Bakker work insurance proposal are enhanced
financial incentives for employers (during the first phase) and the municipalities (during
the third phase) to prevent long-term unemployment. The enhanced incentives for
municipalities are in line with the successful Social Assistance Act introduced in the
Netherlands on 1 January 2004. The Act provides the basis for welfare benefits paid to
households that have no other ‘means of existence’. A key aim of the new act was to get
more welfare benefit recipients back to work by giving more authority and financial
responsibility for benefits to risk-bearing municipalities. Research shows that the stronger
financial incentives faced by municipalities have indeed stimulated these municipalities to
cut welfare rolls substantially [7].
Disability benefits
An important benefit programme in the Netherlands is the disability programme, which
covers an employee’s loss of income due to long-term sickness and disability. Since its
introduction in 1967 until the beginning of the 1990s, the number of disability benefit
recipients has increased steadily (see Fig. 1). Indeed, disability schemes came to be used
increasingly as an attractive route to exit the labour market. Between 1994 and 1996, the
1 The SER is the most important advisory body to the Dutch government on socio-economic issues. It
consists of representatives of employers’ organisations and unions, as well as independent members (known
as ‘crown members’).
2 An LWI is a labour market office in which municipalities and the current administrative body that pays
out unemployment benefits (UWV) participate.
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number of disability recipients decreased somewhat. This temporary decrease was due
mainly to a tightening of the eligibility criteria in 1993—in particular, the definition of
disability—and to more frequent reassessments based on these stricter criteria. However,
the number of disability beneficiaries started to rise again between 1996 and 2003—even
though an economic boom created strong job growth. As a result, the number of disability
recipients approached one million (13% of the labour force) in 2003. The disability rate in
the Netherlands is among the highest in the world. In particular, women and older workers
face a high risk of becoming disabled [4]. With female and older workers constituting an
increasing share of the future workforce, the number of disability recipients could be
expected to substantially surpass one million recipients during the next decade.
In contrast to similar public insurance schemes in other European countries, the Dutch
Disability Insurance Act (WAO) covered both work-related injury (professional risk) and
non-work-related injury (social risk). It also allowed access to the scheme without taking
into account the recipient’s previous working history. Moreover, employees could apply
for benefits as soon as their earning capacity was reduced by only 15% due to long-term
sickness or disability. Finally, the disability benefit lasted longer (as long as the disability
applied) and was at least as high as other social security benefits (such as the unem-
ployment insurance benefit and social assistance). All of these factors explain why
disability insurance became a very popular arrangement for early retirement during the past
few decades. The government tried to reduce benefit levels in 1993 not only by tightening
the eligibility criteria but also by limiting the duration of wage-based benefits. This latter
measure was ineffective, however, because social partners agreed to take out additional
(private) insurance policies to insure against the tighter criteria in the public insurance
scheme. The number of disability benefit recipients therefore continued to increase at the
end of the 1990s.
At the beginning of 2001, a group of experts was commissioned. This group’s rec-
ommendations (the ‘‘Donner proposals’’) were based on the premise that maintenance and
use of available labour capacity should have the highest priority, and that the main
responsibility for ensuring this rests with both employers and employees. In September
2003, the coalition agreement of the Balkenende cabinet I included a major regime change
in disability insurance, mainly based on the Donner proposals [9]. The government
intended to limit eligibility by tightening entry conditions and reducing benefit levels for
the partially disabled. People who are partially disabled (with a degree of disablement of at
Fig. 1 The number of people in the Netherlands collecting disability benefits (thousands)
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least 35%) or who face a good chance of recovery can either collect a supplement to the
wage they are earning (if they are working) or qualify for an unemployment benefit (if they
are not working). After expiration of the unemployment benefit, the benefit equals the
share of the social minimum income level that corresponds to their degree of disability.
Those employees who are partially disabled with a degree of disability less than 35% no
longer have access to disability benefits and must make their own way through the labour
market, preferably with the same employer as before. Moreover, applications for disability
benefits are subject to a more rigorous screening of the loss of earning capacity, and the
primary responsibility of employers and employees for limiting absence due to illness is
extended from one to two years. The new Disability Act (WIA) was implemented on 1
January 2006, while the enhanced responsibility of employers and employees for limiting
absence due to illness was in force from 1 January 2004 and the more rigorous screening of
the loss in earnings capacity started on 1 October 2004.3 There is another new element in
the system: for insuring partial disability employers can choose between private insurance
(based on experience rating) or public insurance (not based on experience rating). As a
result of these measures, the number of disabled persons has dropped in recent years
(Fig. 1).4
New concerns have recently arisen, however, about an increasing number of disability
benefits for handicapped young persons without any work history. The present government
has proposed additional measures to contain this rise by encouraging young people with a
handicap to work—if necessary in an adapted work environment with job support, in which
the disability scheme supplements earned income. Indeed, the focus should be on what
people can still do instead of what they cannot do. Moreover, income protection for
vulnerable people should not discourage young people from work.
Health care
The Dutch health insurance system is divided into three pillars. The first pillar is com-
pulsory national health insurance (AWBZ). The AWBZ provides coverage to the whole
population against catastrophic risks such as hospital care exceeding one year, nursing
homecare and institutional care for mentally and physically handicapped persons. It
accounts for about 44% of total health expenditure [8]. Up to a certain income level, the
AWBZ premium is income-related. The second pillar is the basic health insurance scheme,
which covers physician services, hospital care (up to one year), prescription drugs,
essential dental care and some physiotherapy, and comprises about 53% of health
expenditure. In 2006, a major reform took place in the second pillar, allowing private
health insurance companies to compete on price and quality. The premium for (most)
employees is neither income-related nor risk-rated, with a compulsory deductible of €150
per person. Finally, the third pillar consists of luxury health services such as hotel services
within a hospital, luxury dental care and prolonged physical therapy. The premium is risk-
rated. This pillar is rather small, accounting for only 3% of total health expenditure.
3 Disabled persons with a benefit who collected this benefit before July 2004 and who were younger than 50
in July 2004 were also subject to more rigorous screening. In the coalition agreement of Balkenende IV, the
age of 50 was lowered to 45.
4 The smaller inflow was also caused by the gatekeeper improvement act of 2002. This act put more
requirements on both the worker and his or her employer to do their utmost to reintegrate the worker. Only if
these requirements were met could the worker become eligible for disability benefits.
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From the point of view of an ageing society, the first pillar is especially important. In
recent years, the expenditure on nursing homecare has accelerated. As a percentage of
GDP, AWBZ expenditures have doubled since the 1980s (Fig. 2).
Moreover, in the absence of further policy measures, AWBZ spending is projected to
rise to 6.4% of GDP by 2020. In addition, the care sector already suffers from staff
shortages. According to projections of the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, 500,000
additional employees will be needed in the care sector in 2020, while aggregate labour
supply is expected to increase only slightly during this period.
Recently, the SER recommended some fundamental reforms to the AWBZ aimed at
improving efficiency, increasing both competition and decentralisation in care delivery and
strengthening the position of the patient more generally [6]. First, in order to target AWBZ
care towards catastrophic health problems, eligibility criteria for AWBZ care should be
tightened. In particular, claims should be assessed on the basis of objective medical pro-
tocols. Second, the current AWBZ claims geared towards social support should be taken
out of the AWBZ and transferred to municipalities (on the basis of the Social Support Act).
If they bear the risk of this support, the municipalities will have incentives to contain
spending—for example, by providing support on a means-tested basis. Third, temporary
care related to medical interventions aimed at curing should be transferred to the second
pillar of health insurance. Fourth, the financing of care should be separated from the
financing of housing, so that accommodation is no longer reimbursed by the AWBZ.
Institutions should thus charge rent separately. By unbundling housing and care, this
reform is expected to give rise to more innovative combinations of housing, medical care
and personal services. Indeed, the elderly can be expected to have more freedom of choice
with regard to where they receive long-term care so that they can remain in their familiar
surroundings longer. Related to this, SER favours a fundamental shift away from the
current supply-side financing to more demand-oriented financing. In particular, resources
should follow the choices of the patients by flowing to the health providers that are selected
by the clients. We believe that the central position of the client can be best implemented
through a voucher system, which offers substantial freedom of choice and good steering
possibilities for individuals [10]. Currently, the Dutch government is discussing the
Council’s proposals in order to make the AWBZ more ‘‘ageing proof’’, especially now that
AWBZ spending is increasing rapidly.
Fig. 2 AWBZ care costs as % of GDP
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Old-age pensions
As with health insurance, the Dutch pension system consists of three pillars. The first of
these pillars is the AOW, which is the basic minimum pension provided by the government
to all residents. The second pillar involves occupational pension schemes, which are part of
collective labour agreements. The third pillar comprises individual provisions. In pension
insurance the third pillar is also relatively small. We thus focus on the first and second
pillars.
Public pensions
The AOW is the public pension scheme and was introduced in 1957. It provides a flat-rate
pension benefit, which is related to the net minimum wage for all residents of the Neth-
erlands from the age of 65.5 The AOW is a mandatory insurance scheme financed on a pay-
as-you-go basis. To finance the AOW, people below the age of 65 pay AOW contributions
over their income up to a certain income ceiling. Benefits are not means-tested. Due to
population ageing, the costs of the AOW are projected to rise from 4.7% of GDP in 2006 to
8.8% of GDP in 2040 [2].
The Bakker Committee proposed two main avenues for addressing this burden. The first
involves gradually increasing the retirement age at which people become eligible for a
public pension. Commencing no later than 2016, the age at which people can start to draw
their state old-age pension would be raised by 1 month each year, in line with increased
life expectancy. By 2040, the state pension age would then be 67. An alternative route to
cut spending would be to individualise the basic pension scheme, so that everyone above
65 years of age receives 50% of the minimum wage, irrespective of the household type.
Single households with low incomes would then be compensated by the means-tested
social assistance scheme.
The second route proposed by the Bakker Committee involves funding the state old-age
pension from general taxation. This broadens the base for financing the pension because
not only would those younger than 65 (who currently pay the AOW premium) pay taxes,
but so would those older than 65. Indeed, as a result of this proposal, the elderly with
supplementary pension income from the second pillar would pay additional taxes on their
pension benefits.6 As of 2011, the state old-age pension would gradually be funded
completely from general taxation over a period of 15 years (people born before 1946 will
be exempt). After the new system has been phased in completely, people would have to
work approximately one year longer to compensate for the higher tax burden on their
pensions. A possible alternative route for reducing the burden of the AOW on those
younger than 65 years of age is to pay tax credits out of general tax revenues (which are
paid by all age categories) rather than out of AOW premiums (which are paid only by those
younger than 65) [3].
5 A single household is entitled to a benefit of 70% of the minimum wage, while an individual living in a
two-person household receives 50% of the minimum wage.
6 In fact, citizens presently older than 65 years of age already contribute to financing the AOW. The reason
is that the contribution rate levied on those younger than 65 has been fixed since 1999. With the ageing of
the population leading to increased spending, a deficit has emerged. This deficit is financed from tax
revenues. Seniors also contribute to these taxes and are thus going to pay an increasing share of pay-as-you-
go pensions.
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Most Dutch political parties are not yet in favour of a higher eligibility age for the
public pension or of financing public pensions only out of general taxation. The current
cabinet has plans for raising taxes on occupational pensions only for those who did not
work up to the age of 65. A possible alternative to the proposals of the Bakker Committee
is to cut public spending on categories other than AOW spending. The budgetary savings
could then be used to cut public debt and thus reduce interest payments. Just as in the case
of raising the eligibility age for the AOW system, however, cutting down public debt by
running substantial surpluses provides a big challenge to the political system, and no
political party has thus far come up with concrete proposals to completely eliminate the
so-called sustainability gap in this way. An important advantage of raising the eligibility
age of the AOW pension is that it yields a double dividend by not only enhancing the
financial sustainability of the public finances but also by raising aggregate labour supply,
thereby addressing the looming staff shortages in the health care and education sectors.
Occupational pensions
Occupational pension schemes supplement the flat public benefit for workers who earn
more than the minimum wage. These schemes are thus earnings-related, and cover about
90% of the labour force. The pension scheme is part of the labour contract, which is
typically negotiated between unions and employers in collective agreements. Up to a
certain ceiling, these pension savings are eligible for consumption tax treatment: premiums
are deductible for income tax (and the AOW premium), returns are tax exempt and benefits
are taxed (although these benefits are exempt from the AOW premium if the beneficiary is
older than 65). The occupational schemes are funded and the value of assets in these
schemes currently amounts to about 125% of GDP. Industry-wide pension funds are
organised for workers in a specific sector of the economy. These sectoral funds own more
than two-thirds of the assets in the second area and account for more than 80% of the active
participants.
The occupational plans are run like defined-benefits plans, which aim at a certain
annuity level during retirement. Years of service and a reference wage typically determine
the benefit entitlement. The reference wage used to be the final wage, but in recent years
most funds have moved to career-average schemes. In these schemes, entitlements to
deferred annuities accrue based on a percentage of the average wage level during a career.
These schemes typically aim at an annuity level of about 80% of average pay (including
the flat public benefit) after 40 years of service. This corresponds to an accrual rate of
about 2% per year.
Early Retirement Schemes (VUT) are separate from occupational pension schemes and
are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. They were introduced in the early 1980s as a means
of combating youth unemployment. In view of the increasing costs for employers as a
result of the ageing workforce, some reforms were implemented. In particular, replacing
VUT schemes by funded early retirement schemes encouraged higher labour force par-
ticipation because, contrary to VUT schemes, pre-funded early retirement schemes are
actuarially fair. Older workers are faced with the costs of retiring early in terms of a lower
pension benefit: workers can retire earlier with a lower pension, or can retire later with a
higher pension. The next step to discourage elderly workers from retiring early was to
gradually eliminate tax benefits for early retirement schemes and VUTs. Moreover, during
the phase-out period, these schemes continue to be eligible for tax benefits only if older
workers are rewarded for retiring later by receiving an actuarially fair higher pension
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benefit. These reforms have had a large impact on the labour participation rate of the
elderly. While the participation rate for the group between 60 and 64 was below 10%
around 1995, it is projected to increase to close to 50% by 2011 (Fig. 3).
To help phase out the early retirement culture in the Netherlands, the Bakker Committee
proposed further reforms, consisting of three steps. The first step is to introduce a tax bonus
for elderly persons who continue to work, which would be financed from higher taxes on
supplementary pensions. The second step is to lower tax benefits of private pensions. In
particular, the maximum accrual rate for tax-favoured career-average schemes should be
cut from 2.25 to 2%, in part to create budgetary room for providing tax benefits to the life-
course saving scheme, which can be used to finance or supplement income in case of
income loss at any point during the life cycle [5]. The last step is to correct annuities for
increased life expectancy so that individuals bear the risk of higher life expectancy at
retirement. As life expectancy increases, workers face the choice between working longer
or collecting lower pensions.
Funded systems are vulnerable to an ageing population not only because of increased
longevity but also because risk sharing has become more difficult. In particular, the ageing
of the members of the funds expands the obligations of the funds in relation to the premium
base (Fig. 4). This implies that unanticipated shocks in financial markets and longevity
require larger changes in pension contributions in order to shield pension rights from these
shocks. Guaranteed pension obligations have thus become more expensive in that they
result in greater volatility in payments from the contributors.
In the face of these developments, pension funds in recent years have more moved to
aspired annuity levels rather than guarantees. In particular, the pension funds aim to index
the pension rights to prices or wages, but this indexing is not guaranteed. In particular,
indexing is conditional on the financial performance of the fund. One can thus view the
current occupational pension system as a hybrid system of guarantees and ambitions;
nominal annuities are guaranteed, but the degree to which pensions rise in line with prices
and wages depends on the performance of the investments of the pension funds.
Through the shift from final-pay to career-average systems with conditional indexation
of nominal pension rights, pension funds have made the indexation of the pension rights of
not only already retired members but also active members conditional on the financial
performance of the pension fund. These reforms have thus strengthened the steering
capacity of the indexing instrument because the indexing of all accrued liabilities
Fig. 3 Average retirement age, 55–64 years
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(including the entitlements of active members to deferred annuities) now depends on the
solvency position of the fund. As a result of these reforms, the active working population
absorbs more risks in terms of their pension rights. Moreover, members (rather than
participants and employers who pay the pension contributions) have become the main risk
bearers of the fund.
Conclusions
Over the past decade, the Netherlands has implemented major reforms in social insurance,
health care and pensions. The Dutch systems in these areas are traditionally characterised
by hybrid systems in which both private and public responsibilities play a role. In recent
years, more tasks of the welfare state have been delegated to private parties. In particular,
private insurance companies play an increasingly important role in disability and health
insurances. Moreover, as the private occupational pension sector matures, private pensions
account for an increasing part of pension benefits.
Another important trend is a shift towards more competition in social and health
insurances and the delivery of health services. This is being accomplished by giving
individuals more freedom to choose; for example, in selecting their own health care
provider or health insurance company. In addition, employers can choose how they want to
deal with the risk of disability and sickness leave. Within the public sector, responsibilities
are increasingly decentralised to risk-bearing municipalities; for example, in social assis-
tance, labour market policies and social services provided to the elderly population. This
allows more tailor-made policies that prevent moral hazard on account of conditions that
are difficult for the central government to verify. In private disability and health insurances,
individual employers and workers are taking on more risk in order to combat moral hazard
and contain spending pressures that result from ageing.
A major remaining challenge facing the Dutch economy is to increase labour supply, as
an ageing population is expected to result in labour shortages in non-tradable sectors that
produce and maintain human capital and are to a large extent publicly financed (such as the
education and health care sectors). Indeed, the major problems resulting from ageing
involve not only the sustainability of public finances and the reduced risk-taking capacity
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Fig. 4 Liabilities and premium base of Dutch pension funds, 1990–2030
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of the economy but also the possible scarcity of human capital. To contain possible cost
rises in the public sector and a loss of international competitiveness in the private sector as
a result of wage pressures, policymakers should continue to improve further the flexibility
of the labour market for elderly workers so that the talents of these workers are better used.
In this respect, the proposals of the Bakker Committee to increase the financial
responsibilities of employers and employees for maintaining the employability of the
workforce are welcome. By giving decentralised parties more responsibilities for unem-
ployment insurance and the maintenance of human capital, these proposed reforms build
on the successes of recent reforms in disability insurance and social assistance. In line
with the Bakker proposals, the possible uses of the life-course saving scheme should be
extended so that individuals not only face more responsibilities for investing in their
human capital but also obtain more instruments for maintaining their employability. These
life-course savings are transferable across jobs and thus help to transform job security into
work security, thereby enhancing the flexibility of the labour market for the elderly. This
will help to further raise the effective retirement age, which is the most powerful instru-
ment to protect labour supply in the face of the upcoming shortage of staff in several key
sectors of the ageing Dutch economy.
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